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321 
Book Reviews 
THE INDIVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 
THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION. By Laurence H. 
Tribe.1 Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. 304. 
$19.95. 
Kermit Roosevelt III2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Laurence Tribe published volume one of the third 
edition of his magisterial treatise American Constitutional Law. 
In 2005, to considerable dismay, he announced that the second 
volume would not be forthcoming. Constitutional law was too 
unstable, he said, to permit the kind of synthesis to which the 
treatise aspired: “[W]e find ourselves at a juncture where pro-
found fault lines have become evident at the very foundations of 
the enterprise, going to issues as fundamental as whose truths 
are going to count and, sadly, whose truths must be denied.”3 
The Invisible Constitution, his first book since that an-
nouncement, does not aim to synthesize doctrine. Indeed, it 
largely ignores doctrine. It is addressed not to the judge wonder-
ing how to rule in a difficult case but to the citizen or govern-
ment official wondering what her constitutional rights and duties 
are (p. 5). Tribe’s message to such a person is clear and simple: 
just because you can’t see it, don’t assume it isn’t there. Much of 
the Constitution, Tribe argues, including some of the most im-
portant parts, is invisible. 
 
 1. Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard University. 
 2. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to David 
Franklin and Richard Primus for helpful comments. 
 3. Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 295 (2005). 
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“Invisible” is a catchy word, but perhaps not the most pre-
cise. Most of the phrases and ideas Tribe goes to identify as con-
tained in the invisible Constitution are very visible; they are writ-
ten down in judicial opinions and inscribed on monuments. What 
he means is extratextual, as he once says (p. 6), and when I use 
“invisible” in this review I will mean extratextual as well. 
Tribe’s claim, then, is that many of our most cherished prin-
ciples and propositions of constitutional law cannot be found in 
the text. After arguing for the existence of this invisible Consti-
tution, he goes on to describe modes of construction that may be 
used to “visualize and articulate the rules, principles, and rights 
that are part of our Constitution but are not discernible in or di-
rectly derivable from portions of its text” (p. 155). 
In what follows, I will describe and evaluate these two pro-
jects: first, the argument for the existence of the invisible Consti-
tution; second, the description of the modes of construction. 
I. ARGUMENTS FOR EXISTENCE 
Tribe uses a variety of different arguments to establish the 
existence of what he calls the invisible Constitution. The differ-
ent types of argument correspond, though not always perfectly, 
to different types of constitutional propositions, which I will con-
sider in turn. 
A. NECESSITY: INTERPRETIVE RULES 
At various points, Tribe argues that we know the invisible 
Constitution exists because it must, because without it the visible 
Constitution is fatally, even logically, incomplete. We need the 
invisible Constitution, he claims, to tell us “what text to accept as 
the visible Constitution” (p. 7). We need it to tell us whether 
amendments can require holistic revision of our reading of the 
Constitution—whether, for instance, the Nineteenth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of sex discrimination with respect to voting 
suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
clause should now be read to prohibit sex discrimination with re-
spect to political rights more generally (pp. 69–70). We need it, 
Tribe might have added, to tell us to read the visible Constitu-
tion’s sentences from left to right, and to assign its words their 
meanings in English rather than German. 
This is partly true. We do need rules to tell us how to read 
the written Constitution, and those rules are not contained in its 
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words.4 But it is an odd leap to suppose that an interpretive rule, 
necessary though it may be, is thereby part of what it explains. It 
is odd, that is, to suppose that the principle that sentences are to 
be read left to right is part of the Constitution. We do not do this 
with other texts—the left-to-right principle would not commonly 
be called part of the invisible Moby Dick—and it is not clear why 
the Constitution is different. 
Tribe has one more argument from necessity, which relies 
on the purportedly self-refuting nature of the denial of the in-
visible Constitution. “Imagine,” he suggests, “an unwritten 
metaconstitutional rule pointing to our Constitution and stating: 
‘In construing this Constitution, the reader must be confined to the 
enacted text.’” If we suppose the rule is correct, we see that it ne-
gates itself. Thus it must be false, and thus, Tribe suggests, “any 
directive to confine oneself to the enacted text must be wrong” 
(p. 153). 
Logic may thus seem to prove the existence of the invisible 
Constitution, but the same technique can prove other things, too. 
For instance, if you have a copy of Tribe’s book, write in its mar-
gin “In construing the Constitution, one must not rely on mar-
ginal notes written in this book.” If you suppose the rule is cor-
rect; it negates itself. May we now conclude that it is false and 
marginal notes are valid guides to interpretation? Write another 
making yourself President. If you don’t have a copy of the book 
handy, a cocktail napkin will serve as well, mutatis mutandis. 
Don’t worry; you aren’t really President. As Tribe concedes, 
the argument is “less than airtight” (p. 153). It fails because 
starting with a contradiction allows one to prove anything, and 
therefore no conclusion thus derived can be trusted. (For an-
other example, consider the following pair of assertions: A: Both 
A and B are false; B: You are President.) The mere fact that one 
assertion leads us into logical puzzles cannot establish the truth 
of other unrelated assertions, especially assertions about the 
world. 
 
 4. Tribe argues further that they could not be, on the grounds that we would then 
need still more rules to tell us how to read them (p. 148). But this is a bit too clever. We 
might not need an infinite chain of rules after all; explanation, as Wittgenstein noted, 
comes to an end somewhere. And if the regress argument were sound, it would apply as 
well to the invisible interpretive rules. We would need not just the invisible Constitution 
telling us how to read the visible one but something else (the ineffable Constitution?) 
telling us how to understand the invisible one. 
!ROOSEVELT-252-BRTRIBETHEINDIVISIBLECONSTITUTION.DOC 4/16/2009  4:13:36 PM 
324 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:321 
The argument from necessity is only partially successful, 
then, and it achieves less than Tribe believes. It shows that there 
must exist invisible interpretive rules, like “read left to right.” 
But it does not establish that these rules are part of the Constitu-
tion, and it does not prove anything about the existence of in-
visible substantive rules, like “one person, one vote.” The fact 
that the visible Constitution itself does not tell us to read left to 
right or the reverse does not imply that the invisible Constitution 
“must of necessity supply and define a significant part of what 
we perceive as the Constitution’s meaning” (p. 154). 
It is the substantive rules, however, that make the invisible 
Constitution worth talking about. Tribe has arguments for their 
existence as well. But these arguments, too, encounter some dif-
ficulties. 
B. THE AUTHORITY OF THE MANY:  
UNCONTESTED SUBSTANCE 
Tribe’s main argument for the existence of substantive in-
visible propositions is that everyone accepts them. “Ask any per-
son,” he challenges at one point, whether the Constitution allows 
representatives to be chosen by districts with significantly differ-
ent numbers of voters. “The vast majority of people,” he contin-
ues, “would certainly be inclined to agree” that the one-person, 
one-vote principle is part of our Constitution (p. 120). 
I suspect that this is true, but its significance is not entirely 
clear—especially since Tribe admits that this vast majority ex-
cludes “specialists in voting theory, many of whom would 
strongly dissent” (p. 121). Arguments from authority are not 
persuasive unless there is a good reason to take the purported 
authority as authoritative. If the idea is that the content of the 
Constitution is actually determined by what most people think, 
we have popular constitutionalism with a vengeance. We also 
have the possibility of some disturbing consequences. Asked 
whether the maxim “From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his need,” is found in the Constitution, over two-
thirds of Americans surveyed answered “yes” or “I don’t know,” 
with a plurality choosing “yes.”5 (The true source is Karl Marx.) 
Perhaps the claim is just that if all or almost all relevant ac-
tors act as though a proposition is part of the Constitution, it is, 
 
 5. See COLUMBIA LAW SURVEY, AMERICANS’ KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION (May 2002), at h t t p : / / w w w 2 . l a w . c o l u m bi a . e d u / n e w s / s ur v e y s /  
s u r v e y _ c o n s t i t u t i o n / f a c t _ s h e e t . s h t m l . 
!ROOSEVELT-252-BRTRIBETHEINDIVISIBLECONSTITUTION.DOC 4/16/2009  4:13:36 PM 
2008] BOOK REVIEWS 325 
 
in any sense that matters. This is also true. But at this point, the 
argument for the invisible Constitution is less argument than ob-
servation. 
Of course, there is value to pointing out features of our con-
stitutional practice that others neglect or forget. But the osten-
sive argument (“look, this is what we all do”) limits the set of 
propositions of which we can be confident to those that are 
largely uncontested. Early in the book Tribe lists eight (p. 28). 
The selection is surprising. It includes the anti-commandeering 
principle developed in Printz v. United States6 and New York v. 
United States,7 which is not accepted by four Justices of the Su-
preme Court, and the principle that government may not torture 
people to extract information, which was so notoriously denied 
by the Bush Office of Legal Counsel.8 
That is in part a quibble; there certainly are many substan-
tive invisible propositions that command near-universal respect, 
including some important ones like one-person, one-vote. But 
including controverted propositions in the list may make it seem 
that the argument from authority achieves more than in fact it 
does. If we know that substantive invisible propositions exist 
only when everyone accepts them, we cannot use the argument 
to convince doubters—the argument is persuasive only when 
there are no doubters left. Contested substance is where the ac-
tion is, and the authority of the many does not establish it. 
C. TELEOLOGY: CONTESTED SUBSTANCE 
Tribe does have arguments for contested substantive propo-
sitions. Notably, he analyzes the forms of arguments in their fa-
vor, the subject of the second part of his book and likewise the 
second of this review. In the first part of the book, however, he 
suggests generally that they must exist, or the Constitution 
would be dramatically worse. Many of our most cherished prin-
ciples are invisible and were once contested; some still are. Re-
ject the invisible constitution, he warns, and “a state may im-
prison someone for speech with which its officials disagree” (p. 
112). It is only the invisible Constitution that stops the federal 
government from segregating schools on the basis of race (p. 
 
 6. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 7. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 8. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Detention and Interrogation in the Post-9/11 
World, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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113), or the President from detaining Americans indefinitely 
without judicial review (p. 95) and ordering torture as a means of 
interrogation (p. 97). 
But perhaps things are not quite so bleak. In his haste to 
champion the invisible Constitution here, Tribe gives short shrift 
to the visible one, in terms of both its resources and its wisdom.9 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply its equal protection 
demand to the federal government, but was it wise of the Court 
to supplement it with an invisible, inverse Fourteenth Amend-
ment that does? The idea that the federal government should 
have a freer hand than the states with respect to discrimination 
actually makes good sense for reasons of both structure and his-
tory.10 It is not at all clear that Bolling v. Sharpe11 has been a 
good thing for racial equality: as Richard Primus has observed, 
the main effect of subjecting the federal government to equal 
protection requirements has been to strike down federal affirma-
tive action programs.12 (And if invidious discrimination really 
seems a threat, the due process clause is not hopeless as a source 
of an antidiscrimination norm.13) 
So even if the written Constitution is limited, those limits 
may not be so bad. But is it as limited as Tribe suggests? Appli-
cation of the Bill of Rights against the states is now uncontested. 
As Tribe points out, it has been achieved through a doctrinal 
legerdemain that bears no obvious connection to text: the rights 
that apply against the states have (somehow) been incorporated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The point 
is significant for both the existence and the legitimacy of the in-
visible Constitution. As Tribe argues, the enterprise of substan-
tive due process—perhaps the invisible Constitution’s most con-
tentious project—looks less controversial if we remember that its 
primary effect has been to apply the Bill of Rights against the 
states. Few people, even those who are generally critical of sub-
stantive due process, would want to reject incorporation. 
 
 9. For an example of how far one can go with text, and an argument that the re-
sults thus produced are superior to much of what the Court achieves with invisible sup-
plementation, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000). 
 10. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (noting historical and structural arguments for greater deference to the 
federal government). 
 11. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 12. See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (2004). 
 13. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive 
Due Process, 8 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 983 (2006). 
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But in fact it may be possible to separate incorporation from 
the more controversial substantive due process rights. At least, 
the fact that the Court resorted to the invisible Constitution for 
incorporation does not necessarily mean that no visible alterna-
tive existed. Incorporation could instead be justified on textual 
grounds by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Supreme 
Court, of course, declined to take that path in The Slaughter-
house Cases,14 but most academics disagree with that decision, 
and there is ample scholarship demonstrating that the incorpora-
tion reading of Privileges or Immunities is at least plausible.15 We 
would probably still have the same arguments over what else 
counts as a privilege or immunity (privacy? abortion?), but the 
arguments would be relatively clearly linked to text. 
So sticking to the visible Constitution would not necessarily 
undo incorporation. As for indefinite executive detention, its 
opponents need not rely solely on the invisible Constitution. 
Unilateral executive detention without legislative authorization 
or judicial review is the quintessential denial of liberty without 
due process of law, and it is hard to see how the Constitution’s 
words are “inconclusive” (p. 95) on this point. 
The torture question is harder. If “the very use of torture to 
extract information violates the Constitution,” Tribe writes, “as 
those who see a policy condoning such torture as an affront to 
everything America stands for believe it does—it is the invisible 
Constitution and not anything in the text that it violates” (p. 97). 
This is true. On the other hand, it is a mistake, as Tribe else-
where points out (p. 35), to suppose that the Constitution con-
tains every proposition we would like it to. 
Perhaps more to the point, the value added by the invisible 
Constitution to the anti-torture side is less than fully clear. The 
proposition that torture necessarily violates the Constitution is 
contested. It is clear, however, that torture is forbidden by fed-
eral law.16 The Bush theory that the commander in chief, acting 
to defend the nation, can disregard this ban is not based on the 
text of the Constitution. If the President does have this dictato-
rial pre-eminence, if torture is permissible despite a congres-
 
 14. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 15. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (2000). 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2001). 
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sional ban, it is the invisible Constitution and not anything in the 
text that makes it so. 
Which is to say, if we’re talking about contested substance, 
we must be aware that the invisible Constitution may have its 
nasty side. Torture affronts everything some people think Amer-
ica stands for, but others have different views. And as long as the 
vehicle for transmuting those views into higher law is invisible, 
there are very few constraints on their content. 
What this means is that teleology is not such a good argu-
ment for the existence of invisible contested substantive proposi-
tions, even at the wholesale level. At the retail level, of course, 
there cannot be a knockdown argument for the existence of an 
individual contested proposition; if such an argument existed, 
the proposition would be uncontested. 
Still, we can be confident that contested substantive propo-
sitions exist in general for the simple reason that they are the set 
from which uncontested propositions emerge. Contested sub-
stantive propositions of the invisible Constitution thus exist in 
the same sense that contested propositions about the visible one 
do: as part of an ongoing struggle over constitutional meaning. 
We cannot be sure which ones will prevail, but we know that 
some will. 
D. ANALYSIS 
Taken together, Tribe’s arguments for existence succeed in 
establishing some things. There must be invisible interpretive 
rules, though they need not be constitutional. There are some 
invisible substantive principles, which we know because every-
one agrees on them. And there are others on which not everyone 
agrees, although we cannot know which of these will win out in 
the long run. The invisible Constitution exists, but, with some 
limited exceptions, we do not really know what is in it. 
Demonstrating even this much is an achievement. It shows 
that the claim, “The Constitution doesn’t say that,” should never 
end an argument. The reminder is valuable, for as Tribe notes, 
that claim is put forward more often than it should be, “by both 
the American Left and the American Right” (p. 39). Still, the 9th 
Amendment does the same thing, though with more limited 
scope, and the fact that “the Right and the Left alike invoke that 
invisible Constitution when it suits their aims” (p. 39) tells us 
something, too. 
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What it tells us is that no one really believes invisibility is a 
fatal flaw. This is not a problem for Tribe’s argument, but it does 
tend to lessen the drama of the first part of the book. The pro-
tagonist may be invisible, but the antagonist is nonexistent. Per-
haps Antonin Scalia, at his most hyperbolic, embraces an en-
tirely uncompromising textualism, but even he knows when to 
let it go. (See, for instance, Printz v. United States.17) And while 
Scalian hyperbole can be catchy, entertaining, and even superfi-
cially persuasive, rebutting it is not worth an entire book, much 
less one by Laurence Tribe. 
The more interesting question is how to decide whether a 
given contested substantive proposition is legitimately part of 
the invisible Constitution or not. Fortunately, Tribe does address 
this. His second “main goal” (p. 42) is to “exhibit the various 
modes of reasoning” used to perform the task. 
II. CREATING THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION:  
MODES OF CONSTRUCTION 
A. THE MODES 
In the second part of the book, Tribe offers six “modes of 
construction,” which he calls geometric, geodesic, global, geo-
logical, gravitational, and gyroscopic. These are fascinating, and 
one wishes he had allocated them more space. (He does include 
hand-drawn pictures illustrating the different modes, which you 
will not find in many books about constitutional law.) 
 1. Geometry 
Geometric construction is what Charles Black and Philip 
Bobbitt termed structural argument. It is the process, Tribe says, 
of “‘connecting the dots and extending the lines’” (p. 157). The 
geometric constructor starts with points identified by the text—
say, the life, liberty, and property protected by the Due Process 
Clauses—and connects them to reveal the principle that “ours is 
a government of laws, not men” (p. 158). Specific textual com-
mitments, Tribe suggests, are the fixed stars of the sky; geomet-
ric construction turns a collection of isolated points into a con-
stellation bearing a larger meaning (p. 171). 
 
 17. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (applying a nontextual restriction on federal power to pre-
vent “commandeering” of state executive officers). 
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 2. Geodesy 
Geodesic construction is what has sometimes been called 
prophylaxis or constitutional implementation.18 It is the construc-
tion of rules to protect or enforce underlying rights or principles. 
The requirement that police give suspects a Miranda warning in 
order to later admit a confession into evidence, for instance, is 
not identical to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of 
coerced confessions. Miranda goes beyond the Fifth Amend-
ment in some cases, for many confessions given without Miranda 
warnings might be perfectly voluntary. But the Miranda re-
quirement serves to protect the underlying constitutional right: it 
offers a clear rule that police can follow and judges review, and if 
police do follow it, the likelihood of a coerced confession is 
much reduced. Such “augmenting rules,” Tribe writes, should be 
considered “part of the invisible Constitution, without some ver-
sion of which the visible Constitution would cease to have much 
force” (p. 176). 
 3. Globalism 
The global mode of construction involves “the comparison 
of our national experience with the experiences and experiments 
of other nations and of international groupings, institutions, and 
practices” (p. 181). There has been much debate recently over 
the propriety of looking to foreign sources in making decisions 
under the United States Constitution, and Tribe gives us a taste 
of some of the more outrageous statements. Professor John 
McGinnis has testified to Congress that the citation of foreign 
cases is “chic” to “cognoscenti” but risks alienating citizens (p. 
187). Robert Bork identified citation of foreign sources as part 
of an “international culture war” engineered by “faux intellectu-
als” who share “a toxic measure of anti-Americanism” (p. 185). 
(Bork’s stridency on the issue makes it all the more interesting 
that the seat for which he was nominated ended up going to An-
thony Kennedy, one of the Justices most receptive to foreign in-
sights.) 
Tribe calmly deflates this overheated rhetoric, pointing out 
that citation of foreign sources is a tradition that dates back to at 
least the early nineteenth century (p. 185). Such solid Americans 
as William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia have cited foreign 
 
 18. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 
(2001); David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988). 
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sources, though Scalia is also one of the fiercest critics of the 
practice (pp. 185–86). Tribe concludes that “most of us would 
probably acknowledge that there is much to be said for learning 
from other nations and from the world community as we seek to 
flesh out the skeleton of basic human rights that has always un-
dergirded our own Constitution’s protections for life and lib-
erty . . .” (pp. 183–84). 
 4. Geology 
Geological construction attempts to dig down from textual 
provisions to discover their “underlying presuppositions and 
premises” (p. 189). It then returns to the surface, using the un-
derlying premise to construct nontextual supplements to specific 
textual rights. This, Tribe suggest, is the method used by the sec-
ond Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,19 where he 
“asked himself what could possibly be the point of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections” of privacy “if there were not some 
substantive limit on the degree to which government agencies 
and legislatures could micromanage the details of personal life 
behind the shield thereby created” (p. 189). (Geological and 
geometrical construction overlap.) Tribe also offers John Hart 
Ely’s Democracy and Distrust20 as an example of geological ar-
gument: an attempt that understands essentially the whole Con-
stitution as premised on the value of democratic self-governance 
(pp. 191–92). 
 5. Gravity 
Gravitational construction, Tribe says, could also be called 
the “anti-slippery-slope mode” (p. 198). It asks how accepting 
particular propositions of constitutional law would shape “the 
‘space’ occupied by the Constitution” (p. 203). This mode of ar-
gument, Tribe believes, supports the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Lopez,21 where the Court held that Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause did not allow it to criminal-
ize mere possession of guns near schools. A “plausible answer” 
to the question of what would follow from accepting such au-
thority, Tribe says, is that “the resulting space would collapse 
into the black hole of illimitable national authority over all of 
 
 19. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 20. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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American society.” Accepting the federal assertion of authority 
in Lopez, which was based on indirect effects on interstate 
commerce, would suggest the federal government can regulate 
anything, since (almost) anything can be said to have such ef-
fects. And since the existence of limits on the federal legislative 
power is one of the basic postulates of our government, without 
which “our Constitution would never have been ratified” (p. 
203), Lopez’s articulation of such limits is plausible in Tribe’s 
view as an example of gravitational construction. 
 6. Gyroscopy 
Gyroscopic construction gets somewhat short shrift, only 
two full pages. The idea, Tribe says, “is that just as a spinning gy-
roscope . . . is governed by vectors of force that give it stabil-
ity, . . . so the Constitution embodies vector forces both centripe-
tal (pulling toward the center) and centrifugal (pulling outward) 
that ensure a measure of stability” (p. 207). Or to put it in more 
conventional legal terms, the Constitution both holds the Union 
together (hence the anti-secession principle, which Tribe several 
times observes is written in blood rather than ink) and protects 
the authority of the states against the national government. Sta-
bility is also enhanced by “the principle that carefully considered 
constitutional interpretations issued by the organs of govern-
ment should not be revisited absent circumstances more compel-
ling than a mere change in the identity of the individuals who au-
thored the interpretation in question” (p. 208). Thus, stare 
decisis arguments also count as part of gyroscopic construction. 
B. ANALYSIS 
The identification of the modes of construction is certainly 
the most creative part of the book, and there is a lot more to be 
said about them. Tribe has indicated in conversation that he 
plans to devote future efforts to that task. I offer here some pre-
liminary thoughts, prefatory to a more complete and general 
summing-up in the last part of this review. I focus on the extent 
to which the modes of construction deserve the name—that is, 
the extent to which they actually do derive invisible substantive 
constitutional provisions. 
Geometric construction is well known under the name of 
structural argument. Tribe’s contribution here is to point out 
that while structural arguments start with text, they end by iden-
tifying non-textual propositions that are supposed to stand on an 
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equal footing with text. That makes them a good example of true 
invisible constitution arguments. 
One cannot say quite the same thing about geodesic con-
struction. The essence of geodesic construction is that it starts 
with constitutional meaning and adds on doctrine. The endpoint 
of geodesic construction is not supposed to stand on an equal 
footing with the starting point. Meaning and doctrine are quite 
different, and to say, as Tribe does, that doctrinal “augmenting 
rules” should be considered “part of the invisible Constitution” 
(p. 176) erases or at least neglects the distinction. 
This conflation is counterproductive.22 It makes it harder to 
understand, for instance, how the Court should view legislative 
attempts to offer alternatives to the Court’s doctrine, the ques-
tion that confronted it in Dickerson v. United States.23 (The an-
swer is that alternatives that are adequately effective at imple-
menting the relevant meaning may well be allowed to substitute 
for the Court’s doctrine, though the one Congress there pro-
posed—scrapping the Miranda rule in favor of the old totality-
of-the-circumstances test—was inadequate.) It makes it harder 
to see what is wrong with the Court’s insistence that federal leg-
islation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment be 
measured against the Court’s Section One doctrine in deciding 
whether it is an appropriate means to enforce Section One. (The 
answer is that that doctrine was crafted with the institutional 
competence of the judiciary, not the legislature, in mind.) And 
likewise, it makes it harder for a nonjudicial actor—ostensibly 
the target audience for this book (p. 5)—to understand what her 
rights and obligations are, and how they may differ from the 
rules courts follow. 
Geodesic construction, then, is probably not usefully con-
sidered a genuine example of construction of the invisible Con-
stitution. It constructs doctrine, and doctrine should not be con-
sidered part of the Constitution, visible or invisible. 
Global construction is hard to evaluate without a more pre-
cise specification of how it operates. There are a number of rea-
sons why a court deciding a case under the U.S. Constitution 
might consult foreign sources. It might, first, look to foreign ex-
 
 22. For an attempt to demonstrate the utility of the distinction in analyzing doc-
trine, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What 
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). 
 23. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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perience for empirical propositions. Defending a ban on physi-
cian-assisted suicide, for instance, states offered the concern that 
elderly people who want to live might be pressured into ending 
their lives by relatives seeking to avoid medical expenses.24 The 
experience of countries that have legalized the practice is cer-
tainly relevant to the question of how weighty this state interest 
is. What foreign sources are doing here, however, is assisting 
judges in applying American doctrine. They are not creating 
doctrine, and still less are they affecting the judges’ view of con-
stitutional meaning. 
Second, one might look to the reasoning of foreign decisions 
for guidance on how to interpret vague provisions of the United 
States Constitution. If we understand the Constitution to enact 
at least some widely understood human rights—equality, say, or 
fundamental fairness—then we might well think that the musings 
of foreign judges on analogous foreign provisions are relevant. 
These could be given the weight their persuasive power deserves 
in figuring out what equality or fairness demand in the United 
States. 
How much weight that is depends in part on what we think 
these general constitutional provisions are intended to embody. 
If one believes that they refer to concepts with objective con-
tours, that questions about equality or fairness have right an-
swers regardless of where or when they are asked, then foreign 
decisions should get more weight. If context-independent an-
swers exist, the answers of foreign judges are directly relevant; 
they are answers to the same questions. Whether equality de-
mands recognition of same-sex marriage, for instance, should be 
the same under U.S. or foreign law, as long as similar equality 
guarantees exist. And so the U.S. Supreme Court could view the 
decisions of foreign high courts as one federal circuit views the 
decisions of another. 
But I find the idea of context-independent answers implau-
sible, at least for the purposes of constitutional law. Whatever 
one thinks of the ontological status of moral concepts as a phi-
losophical matter—regardless, that is, of whether one is a moral 
realist or moral relativist25—it seems unlikely that those who 
draft and ratify constitutions intend to be governed by some phi-
 
 24. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731–32 (1997). 
 25. For a discussion of moral realism and relativism in the context of an attack on 
the former, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY 17–29 (1999). 
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losophically pure concept rather than the commonsense and con-
text-sensitive understanding that they have at the time. They 
probably understand that future generations will differ with re-
spect to particular applications of those concepts, and in choos-
ing general language they license future generations to follow 
the views of the future and not the past. (Unless they are very 
stupid drafters, we can guess that this is actually what they ex-
pect to happen.) But they do not intend their own generation to 
be bound to a commitment they would not recognize as con-
tained in the concept they invoke. 
To ground this abstract discussion in the framework of a 
particular constitutional problem, the drafters and ratifiers of the 
Equal Protection Clause probably intended to prohibit what 
they recognized as invidious or oppressive discrimination. They 
presumably knew that future generations might differ over what 
kinds of discrimination were invidious or oppressive. And by 
choosing general language they gave the future the freedom to 
follow its own views on, for instance, racial segregation of public 
schools.26 It was constitutionally correct, then, for judges in the 
nineteenth century to uphold racial segregation of schools (when 
most Americans, or at least most with a voice in politics, thought 
it reasonable) and for judges in the twentieth century to strike it 
down (when attitudes had shifted). It would not have been cor-
rect for judges in the nineteenth century to strike it down on the 
grounds that it was “really” invidious even though the dominant 
consensus deemed it reasonable, and it would be jumping the 
gun quite a bit for those judges to strike it down on the grounds 
that twentieth century Americans would find it invidious. 
What does this mean for the relevance of foreign decisions? 
The past, proverbially, is a foreign country. With respect to for-
eign decisions and American constitutional law, we could also 
say the reverse. The views of foreign countries about the de-
mands of an abstract concept such as fairness or equality are like 
the views of past (or future) generations of Americans. They are 
relevant, but they are not the views that matter most. 
This is true for general principles such as equality or fair-
ness, and perhaps more true for constitutional provisions that 
specifically invoke community standards. If we think that the 
 
 26. For further amplification of this view, see KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH 
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 47–58 (2006); J.M Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–311 (2007). 
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constitutional prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” 
requires judges to determine how rare a punishment is, they 
should consider its incidence in the United States. It is easy to 
see why our Constitution would have a provision constraining 
outlier states or the federal government to meet a threshold 
standard of decency set by national consensus. It is much harder 
to imagine why we would have one that constrains America by 
international standards, and I do not think that this was the pur-
pose of the 8th Amendment. 
Global construction, then, requires a bit more specification 
before we can really evaluate it. We can, however, conclude that 
it is not likely to be a successful mode of constructing the invisi-
ble Constitution. There are unproblematic ways to learn from 
foreign experience, but the most unproblematic do not involve 
the construction of constitutional meaning. As far as constitu-
tional meaning is concerned, the stronger argument is for not 
giving too much weight to foreign decisions. That is, in constitu-
tional law there is something to be said for relativism—though 
the conservatives who decry citation of foreign sources would 
probably not welcome that label. Last, even the realist position, 
which uses foreign sources to support particular outcomes, is not 
really an invisible Constitution argument. It is simply applying 
vague text to particular circumstances. 
Geological construction is similar to geometric, in that it 
starts with text and produces nontextual propositions of equiva-
lent constitutional stature. It too is a solid example of invisible 
constitutional argumentation. 
Gravitational construction is somewhat more troubling. It 
may well be that we can identify undesirable or unconstitutional 
end states, the black holes to which Tribe refers. A world in 
which the federal government regulates every detail of daily life 
on the basis of indirect effects on interstate commerce is one in 
which the Constitution has failed. 
But identifying these prohibited end states tells us only 
where we should not go. It does not tell us how to avoid getting 
there. It does not tell us, in particular, that judicial supervision is 
appropriate, how aggressive such judicial supervision should be, 
or what form it should take. It is perfectly possible, for instance, 
to assert both that the federal government is one of limited pow-
ers and that judges should be at most very hesitant to second-
guess a congressional determination that a given activity has a 
sufficient effect on interstate commerce to make its regulation 
necessary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce. It 
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is possible, that is, to believe that the safeguards of federalism 
are political and not judicial in nature.27 (The argument that pre-
vails in Lopez is virtually identical to the one put forward against 
the First Bank of the United States by James Madison and Ed-
mund Randolph, rejected by George Washington when he 
signed the bill, and by John Marshall, with respect to the Second 
Bank, in McCulloch v. Maryland.28) 
Tribe derides the idea that the “fickle realities of politics” 
may be trusted to prevent “totalitarian intrusions” (p. 204). But 
he may be placing too little faith in politics and too much in 
judges. In at least some circumstances—when the structure of 
the political system is sound—we may be relatively confident 
that the government will not do horrible things, or, if it does, 
that the democratic process will remedy those mistakes.29 In 
those circumstances, if the government does do something that 
seems horrible, and the public endorses it, neither judges nor the 
invisible Constitution are likely to stand long in its way.30 
Gravitational construction, then, also requires more flesh-
ing-out if it is to be a sensible mode of constitutional develop-
ment. We will need some way of telling when an apparent slip-
pery slope is indeed to be feared, and when, to the contrary, 
power can be lodged with a government actor in the confidence 
that it will not be abused. When the fear is reasonable, we will 
need something to tell us what kinds of limits judges should 
erect. (Even if one thinks that Lopez is a needed judicial re-
sponse to congressional abuse of the commerce power, one 
might take issue with the form of the restrictions it crafted.) And 
there is no a priori reason to think that these limits will be better 
 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (noting “the Founders’ considered judgment that that politics, not judicial review, 
should mediate between state and national interests”); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (“The political process ensures that laws 
that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”). 
 28. For a discussion of the arguments for and against the Bank, see PAUL BREST, 
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 28–51 (5th ed. 2006). 
 29. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the 
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on 
you and me.”). 
 30. Or as Learned Hand put it, “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when 
it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies 
there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.” Learned Hand, The Spirit of 
Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 190 
(Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
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understood as components of judicially-derived constitutional 
meaning, rather than judicially-crafted doctrine. 
Gyroscopic construction is both interesting and sensible, 
and it derives true invisible Constitution principles. The Consti-
tution is certainly intended to preserve both the states and the 
union, and such propositions as are necessary to those ends can 
fairly be inferred, though of course the degree of plausibility 
may vary from case to case. The method of reasoning by which 
courts have done so could be called structural, which gives the 
gyroscopic mode some affinity with the geometric and geological 
modes. 
III. ON TAXONOMY 
The first part of The Invisible Constitution is certainly cor-
rect, even undeniable. The invisible Constitution exists, and it is 
important. But the very undeniability of that conclusion reduces 
the payoff from the first part of the book. It is a valuable re-
minder for lazy and dogmatic textualists, but one hopes their 
numbers are relatively few. 
The second part is far more debatable, as I have said, but 
also, and not coincidentally, far more interesting. To evaluate 
The Invisible Constitution as a whole, we need to consider what 
the two parts together achieve. And to get a clear picture of that, 
we need to locate it within the realm of constitutional scholar-
ship. 
Recently, scholars including myself have turned their focus 
away from arguing for or against particular propositions of con-
stitutional law and towards the task of identifying different kinds 
of propositions.31 They distinguish, for instance, between state-
ments that reflect the meaning of the Constitution and state-
ments that articulate doctrine courts use to implement that 
meaning.32 For example, one might suppose that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause embodies the meaning that government decision-
makers must weigh the interests of all affected people equally 
when considering some policy. One could then evaluate Equal 
Protection doctrine such as the tiers of scrutiny in terms of how 
well it serves the purpose of implementing this meaning. 
 
 31. For a survey of the scholarship, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision 
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (2004). 
 32. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 26, at 37–47. 
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On its face, The Invisible Constitution falls into this increas-
ingly popular category of constitutional taxonomy. But it does so 
in a very ambivalent way. Tribe’s purpose in the first part is not 
to argue that it useful to distinguish between visible and invisible 
propositions of constitutional law. Indeed, it is almost the oppo-
site. Tribe comes to praise the invisible Constitution and by the 
same token to bury the visible/invisible distinction. His argument 
is that the distinction matters much less than some would have 
you suppose. 
In this he is certainly right. One might think that the invisi-
ble Constitution differs dramatically from the written one. One 
might think that it is, for instance, more malleable (because text 
constrains judges), less legitimate (because it was never ratified), 
and harder to identify (because it is invisible). But it turns out 
that the invisible Constitution is not actually very different on 
these criteria. This is largely because the visible Constitution is 
less constraining, less legitimate, and less easy to identify than is 
commonly supposed. 
Text can constrain, of course, and sometimes it does. But 
many very important pieces of text, such as the First Amend-
ment or the Equal Protection Clause, constrain very little. They 
operate, as Jack Balkin has put it, as frameworks that create a 
space for future generations to argue about the specific applica-
tions of general concepts.33 They do not constrain to the extent of 
dictating right answers to difficult constitutional cases, and they 
were probably not intended to. Furthermore, when the Court 
wants to, it can run against the text for quite a ways—consider its 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, or the Slaughterhouse Cases’ 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Construction of the invisible Constitution, by comparison, 
operates under the same constraints that are most significant 
with respect to interpretation of the visible one. There are the 
professional norms of judges, their education, and the appoint-
ment process, which ensures that courts eventually come around 
to majority opinion.34 
As for legitimacy, the legitimacy of the written Constitution 
is easy to overstate. The historical act of ratification is famously 
 
 33. See J.M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 34. See J.M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 516 (2007). 
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difficult to translate into a present consent of the governed35; it 
was illegal under the Articles of Confederation36; and the Recon-
struction Amendments are likewise procedurally less than pure.37 
If that is not enough, there is the fact that the doctrine doing the 
work in deciding cases was never ratified by the People at all; it 
was created by judges. 
The legitimacy of the invisible Constitution is, from one 
perspective, enhanced by its apparent malleability. It offers a 
vehicle for nonjudicial and even nongovernmental actors to ar-
gue about constitutional meaning, about the core commitments 
of the American people. Creating a space for such argument is 
one of the main things the Constitution does, and it is by engag-
ing in these arguments that each generation makes the Constitu-
tion its own.38 
Last, the ease of identifying the visible Constitution is com-
plicated by the fact that the textual Constitution does so little. 
Without doctrinal glosses on the text, the words of the Constitu-
tion will not resolve many cases, at least not many interesting 
ones. And there is even some dispute about which amendments 
were validly ratified—about the Reconstruction amendments, as 
noted above, and also about the Twenty-Seventh.39 
In comparison, the invisible Constitution is just as easy to 
identify: generally speaking, one need only read Supreme Court 
opinions or the lintels of federal buildings. That is harder than 
reading the Constitution, but again, reading the Constitution will 
not tell us whether flag burning or nude dancing are protected 
by the First Amendment. We will need to consult the Supreme 
Court, or some other authority, to understand the text. 
This is not to say that there are no differences. The invisible 
Constitution, generally speaking, is probably on average more 
malleable and less permanent than the visible one. People dis-
agree about what America stands for, and it is to show that these 
disagreements have been resolved, at least partially, that we 
write things down. Winners write not just history but also consti-
tutional amendments, as Reconstruction demonstrates. 
 
 35. For a survey of “dead hand” arguments, see Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Argu-
ments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991). 
 37. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–252 
(1998). 
 38. See Balkin, supra note 26, at 302. 
 39. See generally Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy 
of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1992). 
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When we are dealing with potentially contested proposi-
tions, then, it actually does matter whether they are visible or in-
visible. For one thing, some visible propositions simply cannot 
be contested; they are too clear. Many people oppose the Elec-
toral College, to take one example, or limiting presidential eligi-
bility to “natural born” citizens, to take another.40 But no one ar-
gues that these are not features of our Constitution, and no one 
thinks that they can be removed without amendment. They are 
uncontested not because they are uncontroversial but because 
they are undeniable. (It is interesting, in this light, that the Re-
construction Republicans felt no need to add an amendment 
providing that no state may secede from the Union—perhaps 
sometimes the sword is mightier than the pen.) 
Less clear visible propositions can of course be undermined 
or thwarted by determined judges. We have seen this happen 
with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and arguably the Sec-
ond Amendment as well. But there is still a difference, and here 
“invisible” is the mot juste. When the Court negates a textual 
provision, it can erase the clause in practical terms. But it cannot 
do so literally. There is evidence of the crime; the body remains 
behind, and there is always the possibility, however dim, of res-
urrection. Many people wait for the return of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, and the Second Amendment stirs again even 
now—indeed, the two clauses could be revived together, if the 
former becomes the preferred vehicle for incorporating the lat-
ter against the States.41 Invisible propositions can be more 
cleanly wiped away. They may linger in dusty volumes of the 
U.S. Reports, but invisible propositions (consider those of 
Lochner) can be dismissed as heresy, which neglected clauses 
cannot.42 
Still, these are differences of degree, rather than kind. Tribe 
is right that the visible/invisible distinction does not mean much. 
Knowing that a particular proposition of constitutional law is in-
visible, rather than visible, tells us almost nothing about it. We 
do not know whether it is substantive or interpretive, important 
 
 40. For a more complete listing of (what some people think are) objectionable con-
stitutional provisions, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & SANFORD V. LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (1998). 
 41. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. —-, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 42. Text, as Richard Primus puts it, is highly “mobilizable” in the service of argu-
ment, while invisible propositions are less so. See Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and 
Mobilizable History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171, 184–85 (2006). 
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or trivial, contested or uncontested, legitimate or illegitimate, 
true or false. 
But given that the visible/invisible distinction is not espe-
cially significant, it is not clear that it is worth trying to catalogue 
distinctive modes of construction for the invisible Constitution. 
The second part of the book, which does so, is thus in some ten-
sion with the first, and indeed not all of its modes are best de-
scribed as specifically dedicated to the invisible Constitution. 
The solution, of course, is to expand the focus. If the visi-
ble/invisible distinction is not particularly helpful, let us abandon 
it. We can use The Invisible Constitution as a ladder, to be kicked 
away once we have ascended. We should consider modes of con-
struction more generally. We should focus on distinctions that 
are useful (I think doctrine vs. meaning is a promising one). We 
should investigate the content of the Constitution as a whole. 
Tribe has suggested in conversation that such is indeed his 
plan. The resulting book would not be called The Invisible Con-
stitution. It would be called The Constitution, or perhaps Consti-
tutional Law. American Constitutional Law, even. I do not mean 
the second volume of the third edition; I am ready to give up 
hoping for that. This book would not describe the lay of the land; 
it would take the field in the struggle over the content of the 
Constitution. It would be a synthetic presentation not of the 
Court’s understanding, but of Tribe’s. Many readers would like 
it better. 
 
